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The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core 
might be a step towards furthering our understanding of matching market performance. We propose 
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Matching markets are of great interest in a variety of social and economic
environments, ranging from marriages formation, through admission of stu-
dents into colleges to matching ﬁrms with workers.1 One of the aims pur-
sued by the analysis of these markets is to ﬁnd stable matchings. There
are, however, some markets for which the set of stable matchings, i.e. the
core, is empty. For these cases, we suggest that instead of using the com-
mon approach of restricting the preferences domain to deal with nonempty
core matching markets,2 other solution concepts may be applied to ﬁnd
“predictable” matchings. We argue that this alternative is a step towards
furthering our understanding of matching market performance.
Our approach consists of associating each matching market with an ab-
stract system (an abstract set endowed with a binary relation) and then
applying one of the existing solution concepts to determine predictable
matchings. The modeling of abstract systems deals with the problem of
choosing a subset from a feasible set of alternatives. Various solution con-
cepts have been proposed for solving abstract systems, such as the core,
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets3 (von Neumann-Morgenstern [31]),
subsolutions (Roth [21]), admissible sets (Kalai et al. [14]), and absorbing
sets. The notion of absorbing sets, which is the solution concept selected
in our work, was ﬁrst introduced by Schwartz [27] and it coincides with the
elementary dynamic solution (Shenoy [26]).
We focus our attention on one-sided matching markets where each agent
is allowed to form at most one partnership. This kind of problem is known
as the roommate problem and is a generalization of the marriage problem,
see Gale and Shapley [10]. In these problems each agent in a set ranks all
others (including herself) according to her preferences. In this seminal paper
it is shown that this problem may not have a stable matching.
The abstract system associated with a roommate problem is the pair
formed by the set of all matchings and a binary domination relation which
represents the existence of a blocking pair of agents allowing transition from
one matching to another. Matchings that are not blocked by any pair of
agents are called stable. In this model the set of stable matchings equals the
1See Roth and Sotomayor [24] for a comprehensive survey of two-sided matching mod-
els.
2See for example, Roth [22] and Kelso and Crawford [16].
3Ehlers [9] studies von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in two-sided matching mar-
kets.
1core. Roommate problems that do not admit any such matchings are called
unsolvable. Otherwise they are said to be solvable.
Core stability for solvable roommate problems has been studied by Gale
and Shapley [10], Irving [12], Tan [29], Abeledo and Isaak [1], Chung [5],
Diamantoudi et al. [7] and Klaus and Klijn [17] among others. With few
exceptions, however, unsolvable roommate problems have not been so thor-
oughly studied. When there is no core stability, interest is rekindled in the
application of other solution concepts to the class of roommate problems.
Such interest is further enhanced from the empirical perspective in that as
Pittel and Irving [19] observe, when the number of agents increases, the
probability of a roommate problem being solvable decreases fairly steeply.
Here we propose absorbing sets as a solution concept for the class of
roommate problems with strict preferences. In this context, an absorbing
set is a set of matchings that satisﬁes the following two conditions: (i) any
two distinct matchings inside the set (directly or indirectly) dominate each
other and (ii) no matching in the set is dominated by a matching outside the
set. We believe that the selection of this solution concept is well justiﬁed
since for a solvable roommate problem it exactly provides the matchings in
the core, and for an unsolvable roommate problem it gives a nonempty set
of matchings with an interesting property of stability. Thus, the solution of
absorbing sets may be considered as a generalization of the core.
The notion of an absorbing set may perhaps be better understood if it is
illustrated with the following description: Consider matchings derived from
an unstable matching by satisfying a blocking pair of agents. This can be
seen as a dynamic process in which unstable matchings are adjusted when
a blocking pair of agents mutually decide to become partners. Either this
change gives a stable matching or a new blocking pair of agents will generate
another matching and so on. If some stable matching exists this dynamic
process eventually converges to one.4 Otherwise the process will lead to a set
of matchings (an absorbing set) such that via this dynamic process (i) any
matching in the set can be obtained from any other and (ii) it is impossible
to escape from the absorbing set5. From this perspective it is easy to see
that an absorbing set satisﬁes a property of outer stability in the sense that
all matchings not in an absorbing set are (directly or indirectly) dominated
4For marriage problems Roth and Vande Vate [25] show that there exists a convergence
domination path from any unstable matching to a stable one. This is also shown for
solvable roommate problems by Diamantoudi et al. [7].
5For unsolvable roommate problems Inarra et al. [11] show that there is a domination
path from any matching that reaches certain matchings called P-stable matchings.
2by a matching that does belong to an absorbing set. As a result, matchings
outside absorbing sets can be ruled out as reasonable matchings.
Among the scant literature on unsolvable roommate problems the papers
by Tan [28] and Abraham et al. [2] are worthy of mention. The former
investigates matchings with the maximum number of disjoint pairs of agents
such that these pairs are “internally” stable and the latter looks at matchings
with the smallest number of blocking pairs. For solvable roommate problems
both proposals give the matchings in the core, but for unsolvable ones it is
easy to check that neither satisﬁes the outer stability property.
The contribution of this work to the analysis of the stability of roommate
problems can be summarized as follows:
First, we ﬁnd that absorbing sets are determined by stable partitions.
This notion, introduced by Tan [29] as a structure generalizing the notion
of a stable matching, allowed him to establish a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the existence of a stable matching in roommate problems. By
using the relation between absorbing sets and stable partitions we also show
that if a roommate problem is solvable then an absorbing set consists of a
unique matching, which is stable and the union of all absorbing sets coincides
with the core.
Second, we characterize absorbing sets in terms of stable partitions. The
characterization provided allows us to specify the stable partitions deter-
mining absorbing sets and its matchings, which are those with the greatest
number of agents without incentives to change their current partner.
Third, we show that all matchings in an absorbing set share some com-
mon features. Furthermore, in the case of a roommate problem with mul-
tiple absorbing sets we prove some similarities among their (corresponding)
matchings. Speciﬁcally in terms of the dynamic process mentioned above,
we ﬁnd that any two absorbing sets have the same set of blocking agents
responsible for going from matching to matching within the set, and that the
other (nonblocking) agents are paired in a stable way, though this pairing is
diﬀerent across absorbing sets.
The rest of the paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2
contains the preliminaries. In Section 3 we study absorbing sets of a room-
mate problem. Those sets are determined in Section 4. We study the struc-
ture of their matchings in Section 5, and Section 6 brings together some
extensions. We also incorporate two appendices. Appendix A contains an
iterative process which is useful to ﬁnd the stable partitions determining
3absorbing sets. Appendix B contains two parts, one with the lemmas used
along the paper and their proofs and the other with the proofs of theorems
and corollaries in the text.
2 Preliminaries
A roommate problem is a pair (N,(<x)x∈N) where N is a ﬁnite set of agents
and for each agent x ∈ N, <x is a complete, transitive preference relation
deﬁned over N. Let ≻x be the strict preference associated with <x. In this
paper we only consider roommate problems with strict preferences, which
we denote by (N,(≻x)x∈N).
A matching µ is a one to one mapping from N onto itself such that for
all x ∈ N µ(µ(x)) = x, where µ(x) denotes the partner of agent x under
the matching µ. If µ(x) = x, then agent x is single under µ. Given S ⊆ N,
S  = ∅, let µ(S) = {µ(x) : x ∈ S}. That is, µ(S) is the set of partners
of the agents in S under µ. Let µ |S be the mapping from S to N which
denotes the restriction of µ to S. If µ(S) = S then µ |S is a matching in
(S,(≻x)x∈S).
A pair of agents {x,y} ⊆ N (possibly x = y) is a blocking pair of the
matching µ if
y ≻x µ(x) and x ≻y µ(y). (1)
That is, x and y prefer each other to their current partners in µ. If x = y,
(1) means that agent x prefers being alone to being matched with µ(x). An
agent x ∈ N blocks a matching µ if that agent belongs to some blocking
pair of µ. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair {x,y}.
Let {x,y} be a blocking pair of µ. A matching µ′ is obtained from µ by
satisfying {x,y} if µ′(x) = y and for all z ∈ N\{x,y},
µ′(z) =
￿
z if µ(z) ∈ {x,y}
µ(z) otherwise.
That is, once {x,y} is formed, their partners (if any) under µ are alone
in µ′, while the remaining agents are matched as in µ.
Tan [29] establishes a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the solvability
of roommate problems with strict preferences in terms of stable partitions.
This notion, which is crucial in the investigation of this paper, can be for-
mally deﬁned as follows:6
6See Bir´ o et al. [4] for a clarifying interpretation of this notion.
4Let A = {a1,...,ak} ⊆ N be an ordered set of agents. The set A is a ring
if k ≥ 3 and for all i ∈ {1,...,k}, ai+1 ≻ai ai−1 ≻ai ai (subscript modulo
k). The set A is a pair of mutually acceptable agents if k = 2 and for all
i ∈ {1,2}, ai−1 ≻ai ai (subscript modulo 2).7 The set A is a singleton if
k = 1.
A stable partition is a partition P of N such that:
(i) For all A ∈ P, the set A is a ring, a mutually acceptable pair of agents
or a singleton, and
(ii) For any sets A = {a1,...,ak} and B = {b1,...,bl} of P (possibly A = B),
the following condition holds:
if bj ≻ai ai−1 then bj−1 ≻bj ai,
for all i ∈ {1,...,k} and j ∈ {1,...,l} such that bj  = ai+1.
Condition (ii) may be interpreted as a notion of stability over the parti-
tions satisfying Condition (i).
Note that a stable partition is a generalization of a stable matching. To
see this, consider a matching µ and a partition P formed by pairs of agents
and/or singletons. Let A = {a1,a2 = µ(a1)} and B = {b1,b2 = µ(b1)}
be sets of P. If P is a stable partition then Condition (ii) implies that if
b1 ≻a1 a2 then b2 ≻b1 a2, which is the usual notion of stability. Hence µ is
a stable matching.
The following assertions are proven by Tan [29].
Remark 1 (i) A roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N) has no stable matchings
if and only if there exists a stable partition with an odd ring. (ii) Any two
stable partitions have exactly the same odd rings.8 (iii) Every even ring
in a stable partition can be broken into pairs of mutually acceptable agents
preserving stability.
Throughout the paper we only consider stable partitions which do not
contain even rings. By Remark 1 (iii) this does not imply a loss of generality.
Using the notion of a stable partition, Inarra et al. [11] introduce some
speciﬁc matchings, called P-stable matchings, deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Let P be a stable partition. A P-stable matching is a match-
ing µ such that for each A = {a1,...,ak} ∈ P, µ(ai) ∈ {ai+1, ai−1} for all
i ∈ {1,...,k} except for a unique j where µ(aj) = aj if A is odd.
7Hereafter we omit subscript modulo k.
8A ring is odd (even) if its cardinality is odd (even).
5These matchings are interesting not only because jointly with stable
partitions constitute a useful tool for the analysis of roommate problems,
but also because they satisfy the property of “outer stability” in the sense
that from any matching there is a sequence of blocking pairs to a P-stable
matching. The following theorem, introduced by Inarra et al. [11], proves
this.
Theorem 1 (Inarra et al [11]) Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate prob-
lem. Then, for any matching µ, there exists a ﬁnite sequence of matchings
(µ = µ0,µ1,...,µm = µ) such that for all i ∈ {1,...,m}, µi is obtained from
µi−1 by satisfying a blocking pair of µi−1 and µ is a P-stable matching for
some stable partition P.
Given the use made of the notions of a P-stable matching and a stable
partition in deriving our results, it may be helpful to illustrate them with
the following example.
Example 1 Consider the following 6-agent roommate problem:
2 ≻1 3 ≻1 1 ≻1 4 ≻1 5 ≻1 6
3 ≻2 1 ≻2 2 ≻2 4 ≻2 5 ≻2 6
1 ≻3 2 ≻3 3 ≻3 4 ≻3 5 ≻3 6
5 ≻4 4 ≻4 1 ≻4 2 ≻4 3 ≻4 6
4 ≻5 5 ≻5 1 ≻5 2 ≻5 3 ≻5 6
6 ≻6 1 ≻6 2 ≻6 3 ≻6 4 ≻6 5
It is easy to verify that P = {{1,2,3},{4,5},{6}} is a stable partition
where A1 = {1,2,3} is an odd ring, A2 = {4,5} is a pair of mutually accept-
able agents and A3 = {6} is a singleton. This partition can be represented
graphically as follows:
Figure 1.- A stable partition P.
The P-stable matchings associated with the stable partition P are: µ1 =
[{1},{2,3},{4,5},{6}], µ2 = [{2},{1,3},{4,5},{6}] and µ3 = [{3},{1,2},
{4,5},{6}].
63 Absorbing sets for the roommate problem
In this section we introduce the absorbing sets for the class of roommate
problems with strict preferences. First, we ﬁnd that absorbing sets are
strongly related to stable partitions so that the notion of stable partition is
converted into a useful tool for analyzing absorbing sets. To be speciﬁc, we
show that each of these sets is determined by some stable partition. Second,
by using this relation, we show that if a roommate problem is solvable
then each absorbing set contains only one matching, and this matching is
stable. Furthermore, the union of all of them coincides with the core. Thus,
absorbing sets may be considered as a generalization of this solution concept
in this framework.
An abstract system is a pair (X,R) where X is a ﬁnite set of alternatives
and R is a binary relation on X. Two of the solution concepts put forward
to solve an abstract system are the core and absorbing sets. In what follows,
we associate a roommate problem with strict preferences with an abstract
system and deﬁne these two solution concepts in this particular setting. Let
M denote the set of all matchings. Set X = M and deﬁne a binary relation
R on M as follows: Given two matchings µ, µ′ ∈ M, µ′Rµ if and only if µ′
is obtained from µ by satisfying a blocking pair of µ. We say that µ′ directly
dominates µ if µ′Rµ. Hereafter the system associated with the roommate
problem (N,(≻x)x∈N) is the pair (M,R). Let RT denote the transitive
closure of R. Then µ′RTµ if and only if there exists a ﬁnite sequence of
matchings µ = µ0,µ1,...,µm = µ′ such that, for all i ∈ {1,...,m}, µiRµi−1.
We say that µ′ dominates µ if µ′RTµ.
As mentioned in the introduction, the conventional solution considered
in matching problems is the core, which coincides with the set of stable
matchings. In roommate problems, however, the core may be empty and
absorbing sets stand out as a good candidate for an alternative solution
concept. For these problems an absorbing set can be formally deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2 A nonempty subset A of M is an absorbing set of (M,R) if
the following conditions hold:
(i) For any two distinct µ,µ′ ∈ A, µ′RTµ.
(ii) For any µ ∈ A there is no µ′ / ∈ A such that µ′Rµ.
Condition (i) means that matchings of A are symmetrically connected by
the relation RT. That is, every matching in an absorbing set is dominated
7by any other matching in the same set. Condition (ii) means that the set A
is R-closed. That is, no matching in an absorbing set is directly dominated
by a matching outside the set.
A nice property of this solution is that it always exists, although, in
general, it may be not unique. Theorem 1 in Kalai and Schmeidler [15]
states that if X is ﬁnite then the admissible set (the union of absorbing sets)
is nonempty (see also Theorem 2.5 in Shenoy [26]). Thus either of these two
results allows us to conclude that any (M,R) has at least one absorbing
set. Absorbing sets also satisfy the property of outer stability, which says
that every matching not belonging to an absorbing set is dominated by a
matching that does belong to an absorbing set.9
Let P be a stable partition. We denote by AP the set formed by all the
P-stable matchings and those matchings that dominate them. The follow-
ing remark follows directly from the deﬁnition of AP and the fact that P-
stable matchings derived from the same stable partition form a cycle among
them.10
Remark 2 Let P be a stable partition and µ be a P-stable matching. Then,
AP = {µ} ∪
￿
µ ∈ M : µRTµ
￿
.
Next theorem establishes that stable partitions may be considered as
structures generating the matchings in absorbing sets. It states that an
absorbing set is one of these sets AP.
Theorem 2 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. If A is an absorbing
set then A = AP for some stable partition P.
The previous relation between absorbing sets and stable partitions is
useful to prove that in solvable roommate problems each absorbing set con-
sists of a unique matching, which is stable. This is shown by the following
theorem.
Theorem 3 If the roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N) is solvable then A is
an absorbing set if and only if A = {µ} for some stable matching µ.
As a result, we have that the union of all absorbing sets coincides with
the core.
To clarify the notion of absorbing sets we consider the following example,
which is also used elsewhere in the paper to illustrate other results.
9This is shown in Kalai et al. [14].
10Example 1 illustrates this fact. See Lemma 1 in Appendix B.1 for its proof.
8Example 2 Consider the following 10-agent roommate problem11:
2 ≻1 3 ≻1 4 ≻1 5 ≻1 6 ≻1 7 ≻1 8 ≻1 9 ≻1 1 ≻1 10
3 ≻2 1 ≻2 4 ≻2 5 ≻2 6 ≻2 7 ≻2 8 ≻2 9 ≻2 2 ≻2 10
1 ≻3 2 ≻3 4 ≻3 5 ≻3 6 ≻3 7 ≻3 8 ≻3 9 ≻3 3 ≻3 10
7 ≻4 8 ≻4 9 ≻4 5 ≻4 6 ≻4 1 ≻4 2 ≻4 3 ≻4 4 ≻4 10
8 ≻5 9 ≻5 7 ≻5 4 ≻5 6 ≻5 5 ≻5 1 ≻5 2 ≻5 3 ≻5 10
9 ≻6 7 ≻6 8 ≻6 4 ≻6 5 ≻6 6 ≻6 1 ≻6 2 ≻6 3 ≻6 10
5 ≻7 6 ≻7 1 ≻7 4 ≻7 9 ≻7 8 ≻7 7 ≻7 2 ≻7 3 ≻7 10
6 ≻8 4 ≻8 5 ≻8 7 ≻8 9 ≻8 8 ≻8 1 ≻8 2 ≻8 3 ≻8 10
4 ≻9 5 ≻9 6 ≻9 7 ≻9 8 ≻9 9 ≻9 1 ≻9 2 ≻9 3 ≻9 10
10 ≻10 1 ≻10 ............................................................
There are three stable partitions: P1 = {{1,2,3},{4,7},{5,8},{6,9},{10}},
P2 = {{1,2,3},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}} and P3 = {{1,2,3},{4,9},{5,7},
{6,8},{10}}. Consider the stable partition P2. The associated P2-stable
matchings are: µ1 =[{1},{2,3},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}], µ2 =[{2},{1,3},
{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}] and µ3=[{3},{1,2},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}] and the
set AP2 = {µ1, µ2, µ3}. Notice that any of these matchings dominates any
other but they are not directly dominated by any matching outside AP2.
Therefore AP2 is an absorbing set. In addition, matching µ1 = [{1},{2,3},
{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}] can be derived from the P1-stable matching µ =
[{1},{2,3},{4,7},{5,8},{6,9},{10}] by satisfying the following sequence of
blocking pairs: {1,7}, {4,8}, {5,9}, {6,7}. Hence µ1 belongs to AP1. It is
easy to verify, however, that µ does not dominate µ1. Thus AP1 is not an
absorbing set since it does not satisfy Condition (i) of Deﬁnition 2.
4 Matchings in absorbing sets
In the previous section we have shown the existence of a link between ab-
sorbing sets and stable partitions. This link is straightforward when the
roommate problem is solvable, since each stable partition induces an absorb-
ing set12. But this result is not maintained when the roommate problem is
unsolvable. In this case from Theorem 2 we know that absorbing sets are de-
termined by stable partitions but, as shown in Example 2, stable partitions
with odd rings may not yield absorbing sets. These results suggest that we
11In this example, absorbing sets select 6 matchings out of 9496.
12Tan [29] establishes the relation between stable matchings and stable partitions.
9should investigate what the stable partitions determining the absorbing sets
are. Thus, in this section, we start by characterizing the absorbing sets in
terms of stable partitions.
For the characterization pursued we deﬁne two types of agents for each
stable partition P (hence, the set AP is deﬁned): “Dissatisﬁed” agents who
move from one matching to another over the matchings in AP without ﬁnd-
ing a permanent partner, and “satisﬁed” ones, agents who lack any incen-
tive to change their current partner over these matchings. As we shall see,
satisﬁed agents play a crucial role in this characterization since the stable
partitions determining the absorbing sets are those with the greatest number
of them.
The investigation conducted proves to be useful in identifying matchings
in absorbing sets. Notice that if P is the stable partition giving rise to the
absorbing set AP then, by Theorem 2, this set is formed by the set of P-
stable matchings and by the matchings that dominate them. The results of
this section are illustrated using Example 2.
Our ﬁrst theorem gives a characterization for absorbing sets in terms of
stable partitions. To obtain it, some additional deﬁnitions are introduced.
Given a stable partition P, let DP denote the set of dissatisﬁed agents that
block some matching in AP, and let SP = N\DP be the set of satisﬁed ones.
In Appendix A we give an iterative process for calculating these two sets.
From Remark 4 of this appendix we learn that for any set A of the stable
partition P, either A ⊆ DP or A ⊆ SP.
Let P |SP= {A ∈ P : A ⊆ SP} denote the stable partition P restricted
to the set of satisﬁed agents SP. Given that the elements in P |SP are
pairs and/or singletons matched in a stable manner, (see again the iterative
process in Appendix A) it is immediate that P |SP is also a stable partition
for the roommate problem (SP (≻x)x∈Sp). Thus, P |SP may be interpreted
as a “partial” matching for the roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N).
We denote by P = {P |SP: P is a stable partition} the set of all such
partial matchings for a roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N). We say that P |SP
is maximal in P if there is not a stable partition P′ such that P |SP⊂ P′ |SP′.
Theorem 4 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. A is an absorbing
set if and only if A = AP for some stable partition P such that P |SP is
maximal in P.
10Then, the number of absorbing sets in a roommate problem can be de-
termined straightforwardly as the following corollary of Theorem 4 shows.13
Corollary 5 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. The number of
absorbing sets is equal to the number of distinct maximal partitions of P.
The following theorem speciﬁes a property satisﬁed by some partial
matchings for the roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N). Speciﬁcally, it proves
that any two stable partitions that determine two absorbing sets have the
same set of satisﬁed agents.
Theorem 6 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. If P and P′ are
two stable partitions such that P |SP and P′ |SP′ are maximal in P then
SP = SP ′.
The following remark, which follows immediately from Theorem 4 and
Theorem 6, states that absorbing sets are determined by those stable parti-
tions with the maximum number of satisﬁed agents.
Remark 3 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. A is an absorbing set
if and only if A = AP for some stable partition P, such that |SP| ≥ |SP ′|
for every stable partition P′.
Therefore, if P is the stable partition yielding the absorbing set AP, then
by Theorem 2 we know that this set is formed by the P-stable matchings and
those matchings that dominate them, and from this remark we also know
that the set of satisﬁed agents of these matchings has cardinality greater
than or equal to the corresponding set for the matchings in AP ′.
To conclude this section, let us illustrate the above results with the
roommate problem from Example 2.
Example 3 (Example 2 continued)
Applying the iterative process in Appendix A to the stable partitions of this
problem gives the following information: For the stable partition P1, we have
that the sets of dissatisﬁed and satisﬁed agents are DP1 = {1,2,...,9} and
SP1 = {10} respectively. For the stable partitions P2 and P3 we have DP2 =
DP3 = {1,2,3} and SP2 = SP3 = {4,...,10}. Hence, the partial matchings of
P are P1 |SP1= {{10}}, P2 |SP2= {{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}} and P3 |SP3=
13Note that two diﬀerent stable partitions with the same maximal “partial” matchings
provide the same absorbing set (See Lemma 6 in Appendix B.1.)
11{{4,9},{5,7},{6,8},{10}}. Notice that P2 |SP2 and P3 |SP3 are the maximal
partitions of P with the greatest set of satisﬁed agents. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 4 and Corollary 5, this roommate problem has exactly two absorbing sets
A and A′ where A = AP2 containing the P2-stable matchings, which are: µ1
= [{1},{2,3},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}], µ2 = [{2},{1,3},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},
{10}] and µ3 = [{3},{1,2},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}] and A′ = AP3 contain-
ing the P3-stable matchings, which are: µ′
1=[{1},{2,3},{4,9},{5,7},{6,8},
{10}], µ′
2= [{2},{1,3},{4,9},{5,7},{6,8},{10}] and µ′
3= [{3},{1,2},{4,9},
{5,7},{6,8},{10}].
5 Structure of matchings in absorbing sets
In this section we investigate the structure of the matchings of absorbing
sets. First, we show that all matchings in an absorbing set share certain
common features. Furthermore, in the case of a roommate problem with
multiple absorbing sets we also ﬁnd similarities among their matchings.
Let AP be an absorbing set associated with the stable partition P and set
AP = A. Then, as in the previous section, the sets DA and SA will denote
respectively the sets of dissatisﬁed and satisﬁed agents for the absorbing set
A.
The following theorem proves that all matchings in an absorbing set
A have some identical pairings formed by the satisﬁed agents which, in
addition, are a stable matching for the roommate problem (SA,(≻x)x∈SA).
Theorem 7 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. For any absorbing
set A such that SA  = ∅ the following conditions hold:
(i) For any µ ∈ A, µ(SA) = SA and µ |SA is stable for (SA,(≻x)x∈SA).
(ii) For any µ, µ′ ∈ A, µ |SA= µ′ |SA.
For an illustration of the result above see Example 3 at the end of Sec-
tion 4.
Next, we investigate the structure of absorbing sets in case of multiplic-
ity. For this purpose, some additional deﬁnitions are required. Given an
absorbing set A such that DA  = ∅, let A |DA= {µ |DA: µ ∈ A} denote the
set of “partial” matchings of the absorbing set A restricted to the set of
dissatisﬁed agents DA. Analogously, if SA  = ∅, let A |SA= {µ |SA: µ ∈ A}.
The following theorem shows that there are similarities among matchings
belonging to diﬀerent absorbing sets.
12Theorem 8 Let (N,(≻x)x∈N) be a roommate problem. For any two ab-
sorbing sets A and A′, the following conditions hold:
(i) DA = DA′ and SA = SA′.
(ii) A |DA= A′ |DA′.
(iii) A |SA and A′ |SA′ are singletons consisting of a stable matching in
(S,(≻x)x∈S), where S = SA = SA′.
Thus, for a roommate problem (N,(≻x)x∈N), all its absorbing sets have
the following coincidences: (i) The set of dissatisﬁed agents is the same for
all matchings across all absorbing sets and so is the set of satisﬁed agents.
(ii) The roommate problem of the dissatisﬁed agents (D,(≻x)x∈D) has a
unique absorbing set. (iii) Satisﬁed agents form stable matchings for the
roommate problem (S,(≻x)x∈S). Hence, the two absorbing sets A and A′
only diﬀer in how the satisﬁed agents are matched.
The three conditions above provide all absorbing sets of a roommate























2 = [{1,3},{2},...] µ′
3 = [{1,2},{3},...]
13Figure 2.- The two absorbing sets of the roommate problem in Example 3.
Example 4 (Example 2 continued)
To explain this last result, consider the two absorbing sets A = AP2 and








are the P3-stable matchings (see Figure 2). Additionally, A |DA= {µ1 |DA,
µ2 |DA,µ3 |DA} and A′ |DA′= {µ′
1 |DA′,µ′
2 |DA′,µ′
3 |DA′} where µ1 |DA =
µ′
1 |DA′= [{1},{2,3}], µ2 |DA= µ′
2 |DA′= [{1,3},{2}] and µ3 |DA= µ′
3 |DA′=
[{1,2},{3}]. Furthermore, A |SA and A′ |SA′ are respectively singletons
consisting of the stable matchings µ = [{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}] and µ′ =
[{4,9},{5,7},{6,8},{10}] in (S,(≻x)x∈S) where S = {4,5,6,7,8,9,10}.
To conclude, some of the above results reveal an interesting property of
stability veriﬁed by all matchings of absorbing sets. First, let us introduce
an additional deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 Given a matching µ we say that a pair of agents {x,y} matched
under µ is strongly stable if, for any matching µ′ ∈ M such that µ′RTµ,
agents x and y are also matched under µ′.
From Theorem 7, we know that for every matching µ in an absorbing set
A those pairs matched under µ |SA are strongly stable. Furthermore, from
Theorem 8 (iii) is easy to verify that all matchings in all absorbing sets have
the same number of strongly stable pairs. These two results jointly with the
outer stability property guarantee that all matchings in all absorbing sets
have the greatest number of strongly stable pairs among the matchings in
M.
6 Conclusions and extensions
Let us emphasize that starting from an arbitrary matching, the process of
allowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match will converge to an ab-
sorbing set with probability one. This enhances the interest of applying
this solution concept to matching markets, since it allows to predict which
matchings may be reached when there is not a centralized matching proce-
dure.
14A potential extension of the results in this paper may be the application
of our approach to more general choice problems such as hedonic games14
(See Dreze and Greenberg [8]), or network formation models (see, for in-
stance, Jackson and Wolinsky [13]). An arbitrary hedonic game can be
associated with an abstract system where the set of alternatives is the set
of all coalitional partitions that can be formed by the agents involved in
the problem. Analogously, for network formation models, Page et al. [18]
deﬁne abstract systems associated with these problems where the set of al-
ternatives is formed by a set of networks. In these two speciﬁc systems the
binary relation represents transitions from one alternative to another and,
as in our chapter, absorbing sets could be proposed as a solution for them
whenever their corresponding cores are empty.
14Diamantoudi and Xue [6] and Barber· and Gerber [3] have pointed out that roommate
problems can be considered as a special case of hedonic games.
15Appendix A
An iterative process to determine the sets of dissatisﬁed and
satisﬁed agents
Given a stable partition P (hence the set AP is immediately deﬁned) the
following process determines the set DP of dissatisﬁed agents, those agents
that block some matching in AP, and the set SP of satisﬁed agents, those
agents that do not block any matching in AP.
The set DP can be determined by an iterative process in a ﬁnite number
of steps. To that end, we deﬁne inductively a sequence of sets  Dt ∞
t=0 as
follows:
(i) for t = 0, D0 is the union of all odd rings of P.
(ii) for t ≥ 1, Dt = Dt−1 ∪ Bt where Bt = {b1(t),...,blt(t)} ∈ P
(lt = 1 or 2), Bt   Dt−1, and there is a set At = {a1(t),...,akt(t)} ∈
P such that At ⊆ Dt−1 and
bj(t) ≻ai(t) ai(t) and ai(t) ≻bj(t) bj−1(t), (2)
for some i ∈ {1,...,kt} and j ∈ {1,...,lt}.15
Given that P contains a ﬁnite number of sets, then Dt = Dt−1 for some
t. Let r be the minimum number such that Dr+1 = Dr. Then, Dr = DP.16
From this iterative process the following remark easily follows.
Remark 4 For any set A ∈ P, either A ⊆ DP or A ⊆ SP.
Example 5 (Example 2 continued)
To illustrate the iterative process above, consider the stable partition P1 =
{{1,2,3},{4,7},{5,8},{6,9},{10}}. Note that P1 contains a unique odd ring.
Then D0 = {1,2,3}. Let B1 = {4,7} and A1 = {1,2,3}. Since 7 ≻1 1
and 1 ≻7 4, then D1 = D0 ∪ B1 = {1,2,3,4,7}. Consider now the sets
B2 = {5,8} and A2 = {4,7}. As 8 ≻4 4 and 4 ≻8 5, then D2 = D1 ∪
B2 = {1,2,3,4,7,5,8}. Finally, let B3 = {6,9} and A3 = {5,8}. Since
9 ≻5 5 and 5 ≻9 6, then D3 = D2 ∪ B3 = {1,2,3,4,7,5,8,6,9} and the
15If no such set exists then Dt = Dt−1.
16This is proven by Lemma 2 in Appendix B.1.
16process is completed. Hence DP1 = D3. Repeating the process for P2 =
{{1,2,3},{4,8},{5,9},{6,7},{10}} and P3 = {{1,2,3}, {4,9},{5,7},{6,8},
{10}} we have DP2 = DP3 = {1,2,3}. Therefore the sets of satisﬁed agents
are SP1 = {10} and SP2 = SP3 = {4,5,6,7,8,9,10}
17Appendix B
B.1 Lemmas
Lemma 1 Let P be a stable partition. For any two distinct P-stable match-
ings µ and µ′, µ′RTµ.
Proof. If P does not contain any odd rings then there exists a unique P-
stable matching and we are done. Suppose that P contains some odd ring.




Set A1 = {a1,...,ak}. As A1 is a ring then
ai+1 ≻ai ai−1 ≻ai ai, (3)
for all i = {1,...,k}. By Deﬁnition 1, since µ and µ′ are P-stable matchings,
there are two agents al, as ∈ A1 such that µ(al) = al and µ′(as) = as. If
al = as, then we set a diﬀerent ring. If al  = as, then, since µ(al) = al and
µ(al−1) = al−2, by condition (3), {al,al−1} blocks µ, inducing a P-stable
matching µ1 for which µ(al−2) = al−2. Repeating the process, we obtain a
sequence of P-stable matchings µ0, µ1, ..., µi, ... as follows:
(i) µ0 = µ.
(ii) For i ≥ 1, µi is the P-stable matching obtained from µi−1 by satisfying
the blocking pair {al−2(i−1),al−2(i−1)−1}.
Let m1 ∈ {1,...,k} such that al−2m1 = as. Then µ = µ0,µ1,..., µm1
is a ﬁnite sequence of P-stable matchings such that, for all i ∈ {1,...,m1},
µiRµi−1 and µm1 |A1= µ′ |A1.
Consider now the ring A2. Reasoning in the same way as before, for µm1 and
µ′ we obtain a ﬁnite sequence of P-stable matchings µm1, µm1+1, ..., µm1+m2
such that, for all i ∈ {m1 +1,...,m1 +m2}, µiRµi−1 and µm1+m2 |(A1∪A2)=
µ′ |(A1∪A2).
Repeating the same procedure for the remaining odd rings, eventually we




mi, and such that, for all i ∈ {1,...,m}, µiRµi−1 and µm |T= µ′ |T.
Now, since µm |(N\T)= µ′ |(N\T), then µm = µ′ and the proof is complete.
18Lemma 2 Dr = DP
Proof. (⊆): First we prove that D0 ⊆ DP. Let A = {a1,...,ak} be an odd
ring of P. We must show that ai ∈ DP for all i ∈ {1,...,k}. Consider the P-
stable matching µ such that µ(ai) = ai. As µ(ai−1) = ai−2 and ai ≻ai−1 ai−2
and ai−1 ≻ai ai then {ai,ai−1} is a blocking pair of µ and therefore ai ∈ DP.
Now we prove that, for each t ∈ {1,...,r}, the following conditions hold:
a) Bt ⊆ DP.
b) There exists a matching µt ∈ AP such that
µt(x) =
￿
x if x ∈ Bt
µt(x) otherwise,
where µt is a P-stable matching.
We argue by induction on t.
If t = 1, we have A1 = {a1(1),...,ak1(1)} and B1 = {b1(1),...,bl1(1)}.17 Since
A1 ⊆ D0 then A1 is an odd ring of P. Consider the P-stable matching µ
such that µ(ai) = ai. Since µ(bj) = bj−1, by (2)18, we have bj ≻ai µ(ai) and
ai ≻bj µ(bj). Hence {ai,bj} is a blocking pair of µ and therefore bj ∈ DP.
Let µ′ be the matching obtained from µ by satisfying this blocking pair.
Now, since ai ≻bj bj−1, by the stability of P, ai−1 ≻ai bj. As µ′(ai−1) = ai−2
and ai ≻ai−1 ai−2, then {ai,ai−1} is a blocking pair of µ′ which induces a
matching e µ ∈ AP such that e µ(x) = x if x ∈ B1 and e µ(x) = µ(x) otherwise,
where µ is the P-stable matching such that µ(ai−2) = ai−2. Let µ1 = e µ and
µ1 = µ. Then, if l = 1 we are done. If l = 2, to complete the proof we need
to show that bj−1 ∈ DP. But this is trivial because as agents bj and bj−1 are
alone under µ1, {bj,bj−1} is a blocking pair of µ1 and therefore bj−1 ∈ DP.
Now assume that t ≥ 2. We consider two cases:
Case 1. At is an odd ring. Reasoning in the same way as before for the sets
At and Bt, the result follows.
Case 2. At is not an odd ring. Then At = Bs for some s < t. By the
inductive hypothesis, there exists µs ∈ AP such that µs(x) = x if x ∈
Bs and µs(x) = µs(x) otherwise, where µs is a P-stable matching. As
µs(ai) = ai and µs(bj) = µs(bj) = bj−1, by (2), we have bj ≻ai µs(ai) and
ai ≻bj µs(bj). Hence {ai,bj} is a blocking pair of µs and therefore bj ∈ DP.
Let µ′
s be the matching obtained from µs by satisfying this blocking pair.
Since ai ≻bj bj−1, by the stability of P, ai−1 ≻ai bj and as µ′
s(ai−1) = ai−1
then {ai,ai−1} is a blocking pair of µ′
s, which induces a matching e µs ∈ AP
17Abusing notation, we write ai and bj instead of ai(t) and bj(t) for all t.
18See condition (2) in the Appendix A.
19such that e µs(x) = x if x ∈ Bt and e µs(x) = µs(x) otherwise. Then, choosing
µt = e µs and µt = µs and reasoning in the same way as before, the result
follows. Finally, as D0 ⊆ DP and, for each t ∈ {1,...,r}, Bt ⊆ DP we
conclude that Dr ⊆ DP.
(⊇): We prove that Dr contains all the blocking pairs of the matchings in
AP. Now, by Remark 2, AP = {µ} ∪
￿
µ ∈ M : µRTµ
￿
where µ is a P-
stable matching. Hence it suﬃces to show that, for any ﬁnite sequence of
matchings µ = µ0,µ1,...,µm such that, for all s ∈ {1,...,m}, µs is obtained
from µs−1 by satisfying the blocking pair {xs,ys}, therefore {xs,ys} ⊆ Dr.
We argue by induction on s.
If s = 1, then {x1,y1} is a blocking pair of µ. Let A = {a1,...,ak} and
B = {b1,...,bl} be the sets of P such that x1 ∈ A and y1 ∈ B. Then
x1 = ai and y1 = bj for some i and j. As {x1,y1} blocks µ we have
y1 ≻x1 µ(x1) and x1 ≻y1 µ(y1), i.e., bj ≻ai µ(ai) and ai ≻bj µ(bj). Suppose,
by contradiction, that {ai,bj}   Dr. If {ai,bj} ∩ Dr = ∅ then A and B are
not odd rings hence, by Deﬁnition 1, we have µ(ai) = ai−1 and µ(bj) = bj−1.
But then bj ≻ai ai−1 and ai ≻bj bj−1, contradicting the stability of P. If
ai ∈ Dr and bj / ∈ Dr since µ(bj) = bj−1 we have bj ≻ai ai and ai ≻bj bj−1.
Hence, by (2), bj ∈ Dr, and we reach a contradiction. If we assume that
ai / ∈ Dr and bj ∈ Dr, a similar contradiction is reached.
Suppose now that s ≥ 2. Then {xs,ys} blocks µs−1. Consider the sets A′ =
{a′
1,...,a′
k′} and B′ = {b′
1,...,b′
l′} of P such that xs = a′
i and ys = b′
j for some
i and j. First we prove that if xs / ∈ Dr then µs−1(xs) = µ(xs). We argue by
contradiction. If µs−1(xs)  = µ(xs) we have {xs,µ(xs)} ∩ {xi,yi}  = ∅.




x if x ∈ DP\D0
µ(x) otherwise,
where µ is a P-stable matching.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we have Dr = DP. We argue by induction on r.
If r = 0, consider µ∗ = µ, where µ is any P-stable matching.
For r ≥ 1, by Lemma 2 (see its proof), there exists µr ∈ AP such that
µr(x) = x if x ∈ Br and µr(x) = µr(x) otherwise, where µr is a P-stable
matching. Let N′ = N\Br. Then P′ = P\{Br} is a stable partition of N′
for which DP ′ = Dr−1. Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, there exists
µ′ ∈ AP ′ such that µ′(x) = x if x ∈ DP ′\D0 and µ′(x) = µ′(x) otherwise,
where µ′ is a P′-stable matching. Let µ∗ and µ be such that µ∗ |N′= µ′,
µ∗ |Br= µr |Br, µ |N′= µ′ and µ |Br= µr |Br. Clearly, µ is a P-stable
20matching. Now, we show that µ∗ ∈ AP. If µ∗ = µr since µr ∈ AP we are
done. Otherwise, as µ∗ |N′∈ AP ′ and µr |N′ is a P′-stable matching we have
µ∗ |N′ RTµr |N′. Hence µ∗RTµr and since µr ∈ AP then µ∗ ∈ AP. Thus µ∗
satisﬁes the assertion in this lemma.
Lemma 4 Let P be a stable partition such that SP  = ∅. The following
conditions hold:
(i) For any µ ∈ AP, µ(SP) = SP and µ |SP is stable for (SP,(≻x)x∈SP).
(ii) For any µ, µ′ ∈ AP, µ |SP= µ′ |SP.
Proof. By Remark 2, AP = {µ} ∪
￿
µ ∈ M : µRTµ
￿
where µ is a P-stable
matching.
(i) Let µ ∈ AP. We prove that, for each x ∈ SP, µ(x) ∈ SP. Let x ∈ SP
and A ∈ P such that x ∈ A. Then A ⊆ SP. If µ = µ, as µ is a P-stable
matching, by Deﬁnition 1, µ(x) ∈ A and since A ⊆ SP we have µ(x) ∈ SP.
If µ  = µ then µRTµ and since {x,µ(x)} ⊆ SP it follows that µ(x) = µ(x)
and therefore µ(x) ∈ SP. Clearly µ |SP is stable.
(ii) Since µ |SP= µ |SP for all µ ∈ AP, the result follows directly.
Lemma 5 Let P and P′ be two distinct stable partitions and let µ and µ′
be a P-stable matching and a P′-stable matching respectively. Then, µ′RTµ
if and only if P |SP⊆ P′ |SP′.
Proof. (=⇒): This is trivial if P |SP= ∅. Suppose that P |SP = ∅. Let
A ∈ P such that A ⊆ SP. We must prove that A ∈ P′ and A ⊆ SP ′.
As µ′RTµ then µ′ ∈ AP hence AP ′ ⊆ AP. Therefore SP ⊆ SP ′. Now,
by Lemma 4, we have µ′ |SP= µ |SP and since µ(A) = A, it follows that
µ′(A) = A. Hence A ∈ P′. Moreover, as A ⊆ SP and SP ⊆ SP ′ then
A ⊆ SP ′.
(⇐=): By Lemma 3, there exists µ∗ ∈ AP such that µ∗(x) = x if x ∈ DP\D0
and µ∗(x) = µ(x) otherwise, where µ is a P-stable matching. First we
prove that there exists a P′-stable matching e µ such that e µRTµ∗. Consider
the P′-stable matching e µ such that e µ |D0= µ |D0. As µ∗(x) = µ(x) for
all x ∈ D0 then e µ |D0= µ∗ |D0. Furthermore, if SP  = ∅ since P |SP⊆
P′ |SP′ we have e µ |SP = µ |SP and as µ∗(x) = µ(x) for all x ∈ SP,
it follows that e µ |SP = µ∗ |SP . Then, for each x ∈ DP\D0, we have
e µ(x) ∈ DP\D0 (otherwise, e µ(x) = µ∗(x) = x hence x / ∈ DP\D0). Let
(DP\D0)′ = {x ∈ DP\D0 : e µ(x)  = x}. First of all, note that (DP\D0)′  = ∅
(if (DP\D0)′ = ∅ then µ∗ = e µ = µ and therefore P = P′). Now we can write
(DP\D0)′ = ∪s
i=1{xi,yi} where yi = e µ(xi). Since agents xi and yi are alone
21under µ∗ we can consider the ﬁnite sequence of matchings µ∗ = µ0,µ1,...,µs
where, for all i ∈ {1,...,s}, µi is obtained from µi−1 by satisfying the block-
ing pair {xi,yi}. Then we have µs = e µ. Therefore e µRTµ∗ and since µ∗RTµ
we conclude that e µRTµ. Finally, the result follows directly by Lemma 1.
Lemma 6 Let P and P′ be two stable partitions. AP = AP ′ if and only if
P |SP= P′ |SP′.
Proof. Suppose that AP = AP ′. Let µ and e µ be a P-stable matching
and a P′-stable matching respectively. By Remark 2, we have AP = {µ} ∪ ￿
µ ∈ M : µRTµ
￿
and AP ′ = {e µ} ∪
￿
µ ∈ M : µRTe µ
￿
. As AP = AP ′ then
e µ ∈ AP and µ ∈ AP ′. If e µ = µ then P = P′ and we are done. If e µ  = µ we
have e µRTµ and µRT e µ. Hence, by Lemma 5, P |SP= P′ |SP′.
The converse is analogous.
Lemma 7 Let P and P′ be two stable partitions. Then for each A ∈ P
either A ⊆ DP ′ or A ⊆ SP ′.
Proof. Let A ∈ P. If A is an odd ring then A ⊆ DP ′. If A is a single-
ton the result is trivial. Assume, therefore, that A is a pair of mutually
acceptable agents. Let A = {x,y}. Assume, by contradiction, and with-
out loss of generality, that x ∈ SP ′ and y ∈ DP ′. By Lemma 3, we know
that there exists a matching µ′ ∈ AP ′ such that µ′(x) = x if x ∈ DP ′\D0
and µ′(x) = e µ(x) otherwise, where e µ is a P′-stable matching. To reach a
contradiction we prove that {x,y} blocks µ′ by using a proposal-rejection
procedure intuitively described as follows. Let y0 = y. Let x1 denote the
predecessor of y0 in P19 and y1 = µ′(x1). As agent y0 prefers x1 to being
alone, y0 proposes x1. If x1 accepts the proposal (that is, x1 prefers y0 to his
partner under µ′) the pair {x1,y0} blocks µ′ and the procedure concludes.
Otherwise, let x2 be the predecessor of y1 in P and y2 = µ′(x2). Since agent
x1 prefers y1 to y0, then, by the stability of P, agent y1 prefers x2 to x1. So
y1 becomes a new proposer in the procedure and oﬀers x2 the possibility of
forming a new pair. Then if x2 accepts the proposal, the pair {x2,y1} blocks
µ′ and the procedure concludes. Otherwise, it may continue iteratively in
this manner.
Formally, we deﬁne inductively a sequence of pairs  {xn,yn} ∞
n=0, that
are matched under µ′ as follows:
19Given x ∈ N, we say that y is the predecessor of x in P if y is the immediate
predecessor of x in A, where A ∈ P such that x ∈ A.
22(i) x0 = µ′(y) and y0 = y.
(ii) For n ≥ 1, xn is the predecessor of yn−1 in P and yn = µ′(xn).
Given that N is ﬁnite there exists r ∈ N such that yn ≻xn yn−1 for all
n = 1,...,r −1 and yr−1 ≻xr yr. Thus the procedure generates the blocking
pair {xr,yr−1} of µ′ and therefore agents xr and yr−1 are in DP ′. We now
show that r = 1. If, on the contrary, r ≥ 2 since yr−1 ∈ DP ′\D0 then agent
yr−1 is single under µ′. Hence xr−1 = yr−1. But then yr−2 ≻xr−1 yr−1,
contradicts the choice of r (xr−1 would accept the proposal of yr−2). So,
r = 1 and since x1 = x and y0 = y we have {x,y} blocks µ′. Hence x ∈ DP ′
and we have reached a contradiction.
B.2 Main results and their proofs
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we prove that there exists a P-stable match-
ing µ such that µ ∈ A. Let µ be an arbitrary matching of A. If µ is a
P-stable matching for some stable partition P then µ = µ and we are done.
Otherwise, by Theorem 1, there exists a P-stable matching µ such that
µRTµ and by Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 2 we have µ ∈ A.
Now, we prove that A = AP. By Remark 2, we have AP = {µ} ∪
{µ ∈ M:µRTµ}.
(⊆): Let µ ∈ A. We must show that µ ∈ AP. If µ = µ and given that
µ ∈ AP we are done. Assume that µ  = µ. Since µ ∈ A, by Condition (i) of
Deﬁnition 2, we have µRTµ. Hence µ ∈ AP as desired.
(⊇): Let µ ∈ AP. We must show that µ ∈ A. If µ = µ since µ ∈ A we are
done. If µ  = µ then µRTµ. As µ ∈ A, by Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 2 it
follows that µ ∈ A.
Proof of Theorem 3. If A is an absorbing set then, by Theorem 2,
A = AP for some stable partition P. Now, as the roommate problem is
solvable, by Remark 1 (i) the stable partition P contains no odd rings.
Hence there exists a unique P-stable matching µ which is stable by the
stability of P. Then AP = {µ} and therefore A = {µ}. Conversely, if
A = {µ} for some stable matching µ, then A satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii)
of Deﬁnition 2. Hence A is an absorbing set.
Proof of Theorem 4. (=⇒): Let A be an absorbing set. Then, by
Theorem 2, A = AP for some stable partition P. We prove that P |SP
is maximal in P. Assume that P |SP is not maximal, i.e., there exists
a stable partition P′ such that P |SP⊂ P′ |SP′. Let µ and µ′ be a P-
stable matching and a P′-stable matching respectively. Thus, by Lemma 5,
23µ′RTµ. Now, since µ ∈ AP and A = AP we have µ ∈ A. Hence, by
Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 2 µ′ ∈ A. But then, by Condition (i), µRTµ′
and therefore, by Lemma 5, P′ |SP′⊆ P |SP, contradicting the assumption
that P |SP⊂ P′ |SP′.
(⇐=): Let P be a stable partition such that P |SP is maximal in P. We
prove that AP is an absorbing set, i.e., AP satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii)
of Deﬁnition 2. By Remark 2, AP = {µ} ∪
￿
µ ∈ M : µRTµ
￿
where µ is a
P-stable matching. Let µ ∈ AP. If there exists µ′ ∈ M such that µ′Rµ then
µ′RTµ. Hence µ′ ∈ AP and Condition (ii) follows.
Now we show that AP satisﬁes Condition (i). It suﬃces to prove that µRTµ
for all µ ∈ AP such that µ  = µ. If µ is not a P′-stable matching for
any stable partition P′, by Theorem 1, there exists a P′-stable matching µ′
such that µ′RTµ. Since µRTµ we have µ′RTµ (if µ is a P′-stable matching
for some stable partition P′ then µ′ = µ can be considered). Thus, by
Lemma 5, P |SP⊆ P′ |SP′ and since P |SP is maximal in P, it follows that
P |SP= P′ |SP′. But then µRTµ′ and since µ′RTµ we conclude that µRTµ
as desired.
Proof of Corollary 5. This corollary is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 4 and Lemma 6
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose, for a contradiction, that SP  = SP ′. Then
SP ∩ DP ′  = ∅ or SP ′ ∩ DP  = ∅. We assume, without loss of generality, that
SP ∩DP ′  = ∅ (otherwise, the argument will be identical except for the roles
of P and P′, which are interchanged). By Lemma 7, for each A ∈ P either
A ⊆ DP ′ or A ⊆ SP ′. Let P∗ = {A ∈ P : A ⊆ DP ′} ∪ {A′ ∈ P′ : A′ ⊆ SP ′}
be a partition of N. It is easy to verify that P∗ is stable. Now we prove
that DP ∗ ⊆ DP ∩ DP ′. By the iterative process described in Appendix A,




0 is the union of all odd rings of P∗.







t (t)} ∈ P∗ (l∗
t = 1
or 2), B∗
t   D∗















for some i ∈ {1,...,k∗
t } and j ∈ {1,...,l∗
t }.
Then, by Lemma 2, DP ∗ = D∗
r∗. We prove by induction on t that, for
each t = 0,...,r∗, D∗
t ⊆ DP ∩ DP ′. If t = 0, this is trivial. Assume that
t ≥ 1. It suﬃces to prove that B∗
t ⊆ DP ∩ DP ′. By Lemma 7, we only
24need to show that b∗
j(t) ∈ DP ∩ DP ′. Since A∗
t ⊆ D∗
t−1, by the inductive
hypothesis, a∗
i(t) ∈ DP ∩ DP ′. Clearly b∗
j(t) ∈ DP ′ (otherwise, B∗
t ∈ P′ and
since a∗
i(t) ∈ DP ′, by (4), b∗
j(t) ∈ DP ′). So B∗
t ∈ P and since a∗
i(t) ∈ DP,
from (4) it follows that b∗
j(t) ∈ DP, as desired.
Finally, since DP ∗ ⊆ DP ∩DP ′ we have SP ′∪(SP ∩DP ′) ⊆ SP ∗ and therefore
P′ |SP′⊂ P∗ |SP∗, contradicting the maximality of P′ |SP′.
Proof of Theorem 7. This theorem is easily derived from Theorem 4
and Lemma 4
Proof of Theorem 8. Let A and A′ be two absorbing sets. Then,
by Theorem 4, there are stable partitions P and P′ such that A = AP,
A′ = AP ′ where P |SP and P′ |SP′ are maximal in P.
(i) Since SA = SP and SA′ = SP ′ and, by Theorem 6, SP = SP ′, then
SA = SA′. Therefore DA = DA′.
(ii) It is very easy to verify that A |DA and A′ |DA′ are absorbing sets
in (D,(≻x)x∈D) where D = DA = DA′ such that A |DA= AP|DP and
A′ |DA′= AP ′|DP′. Since SP|DP = SP ′|DP′ = ∅, from Lemma 6, we conclude
that A |DA= A′ |DA′.
(iii) This follows directly from Theorem 7.
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